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Abstract. We develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role
of the media in electoral competition. When policy payoffs are
state-dependent, party policies do not converge to the median
voter’s ideal policy if the media report only party policies. News
analysis about the state, though possibly biased, can discipline
off-equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more cen-
trist policies. Since voters are rational, the party favored by the
media need not win with a higher probability. Instead, media
bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and
lead to more polarized policies.
JEL Classification. D72, D82
Keywords. media bias, cheap talk, policy convergence
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1 Introduction
In elections voters have little incentive to gather information about complex
social issues. Instead they rely on information provided by the news media.
Surveys have found that a majority of American voters regularly watch
television news and read newspapers, and many of them consider the mass
media their principal source of information on public policy and politics.
While relying on the news media allows voters to economize on the cost
of information, it also creates an agency problem—the media may influ-
ence political outcomes through its agenda setting and framing ability. The
charge that American news media are biased is not new. Conservatives have
long complained about the “liberal bias” in the mainstream media. More re-
cently, the rising popularity of conservative cable-television and radio news
programs and the increasing commercialization of mainstream media have
led liberals to question whether the media are becoming dominated by busi-
ness and conservative interests. The perception of media bias undermines
the credibility of the media. An opinion poll reports that in 2004 none of
the mainstream media outlets has more than 35 percent of the respondents
saying that they can believe all or most of what they see on it (The Pew
Center for the People and the Press 2004).
Media bias arises because the media do not merely “report” news. On
many social issues political parties offer conflicting theories to justify their
own policy proposals. For example, in the recent debate on social security
reform, Republicans who favor private accounts argue that private accounts
generate higher returns and the current pay-as-you-go system is insolvent,
while Democrats dispute these claims and argue that diverting payroll tax
to private accounts will worsen the budget deficit. Instead of repeating
both sides’ arguments, a media outlet may conduct its own investigation to
provide an independent assessment. But once a media outlet takes side in
policy debates, its views would inevitably be colored by the preference of its
editors and journalists.
To avoid the perception of bias, media outlets sometimes try to make
news “balanced” and “objective” by giving equal coverage to the views of
both sides and refrain from judgments that could be construed as subjective
(Fallows 1996). But such a strategy, which presents all policy disagreements
as if opinions are evenly divided, may hinder reporting. In a recent article,
media critic Michael Massing quotes a reporter of the Los Angeles Times
who was frustrated by his editor’s effort to make his news story balanced:
“I am completely exasperated by this approach to the news. The
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idea seems to be that we go out to report but when it comes time
to write we turn our brains off and repeat the spin from both
sides. God forbid we should . . . attempt to fairly assess what we
see with our own eyes. ‘Balanced’ is not fair, it’s just an easy
way of avoiding real reporting and shirking our responsibility to
inform readers.”1
At issue is the role of the media in the democratic process. Should they
act as watchdogs or passive information providers? In this paper we consider
this question and examine the effect of media bias in a Downsian model of
electoral competition. We find that media scrutiny, even when potentially
biased, can still serve an important social function, making political par-
ties more responsive to the preference of the median voter. It is therefore
counter-productive to avoid bias by reporting uncritically.
In our model two political parties compete by choosing policies from
a one-dimensional policy space. The policy payoff is a function of a one-
dimensional state variable that is observed only by the parties and the media
but not by voters, who learn about it through the media. The parties do not
have the same policy preference as the median voter’s. One of them prefers
a more left-wing policy while the other prefers a more right-wing one. Hence
they may propose policies different from the one preferred by the median
voter.
The media report the parties’ policies and may also report the state. The
latter enables voters to calculate policy payoffs and amounts to the type of
independent scrutiny that is the focus of this study. We assume that the
media must report party policies truthfully but they may lie about the state
in order to promote the policy they prefer. This does not mean that voters
are necessarily deceived. Since voters are aware of the media’s incentives,
they interpret reports about the state rationally. Furthermore, voters may
also deduce the state from the parties’ policies.
We first consider the case where the media report uncritically. In our
model this corresponds to the media reporting only party policies but not
the state. We find that in this case in equilibrium the political outcome
must deviate from the median voter’s ideal policy in some state. The de-
viation can be large. Within the class of linear equilibria, complete policy
1The news story in question, published shortly before the 2004 Presidential Election,
concerns voter intimidation by the two parties in several swing states. The reporter, based
on his own investigation, felt that the Republicans’ offense was much more serious than
the Democrats’, but the editor decided to give equal coverage to the claims of both sides.
See Massing (2005).
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divergence—each party proposing its own favorite policy—is the only equi-
librium outcome. Interestingly, in this equilibrium the median voter actually
can infer the state and the best policy for him from the parties’ policies; nev-
ertheless neither party has any incentive to respond.
By informing voters of the pros and cons of parties’ policies, media
scrutiny induces the parties to propose policies that serve the interests of
the median voter. In our model, if the media are unbiased, the median voter
will always elect the party whose policy is better according to the media. In
that case, the model becomes a standard Downsian model, and both parties’
policies will converge to the median voter’s ideal policy. Uncertainty about
bias reduces the influence of the media. Nevertheless, we show that so long
as the media are not entirely one-sided, voters will still “trust” the media in
the sense that in the event of a policy deviation they are more likely to elect
a party when it is supported by the media than when it is not. The incentive
to seek media support, therefore, provides a discipline against deviations by
the political parties. The result is a greater degree of policy convergence
compared to the case where the media report only party policies.
According to the conventional wisdom, the media help the party they
favor. That is not necessarily the case in our model. Since voters are aware
of the media’s objectives, they interpret news strategically. As a result,
media bias does not result in biased policies, nor does the party favored by
the media always win with higher probability. Nevertheless, media bias is
costly because it may cause voters to distrust news. When that happens,
both parties have weaker incentives to pursue centrist policies, and party
policies becomes more polarized. A solution to this problem is to have more
media outlets. When voters have access to news from multiple sources, they
can better judge which party’s policy serves their interests. We show that
two media outlets are better than one, in the sense that they bring about
greater policy convergence. Indeed, as the number of independent media
outlets becomes sufficiently large, there is full policy convergence even when
individual media outlets are biased.
1.1 Related Literature
Recently there is growing interest among economists on the issue of me-
dia bias. Baron (2006) argues that media bias originates from journalists
who distort the news to further their career objectives, and media owners
give discretion to journalists in exchange for lower wages. Anderson and
McLaren (2007) examine a model where ideological media outlets manipu-
late the beliefs of news consumers by hiding information. They argue that
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media merger can raise profits but reduce the amount of information trans-
mission. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) suggest the media slant news to
satisfy biased readers who prefer news that conforms to their existing beliefs.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show how media bias can arise endogenously
when Bayesian consumers infer that news reports which conform to their pri-
ors are from high quality news sources. Bernhardt et al. (forthcoming) study
how the polarization of the electorate can increase news slant and raise the
likelihood of electoral mistakes. Other papers that study the policy effects
of the media include Stromberg (2004), which argues that public policies
tend to favor groups that receive more news coverage from the media, and
Besley and Prat (2006), which examines the ability of the government to
capture the media and hence to influence political outcomes.
In the papers cited above, the media influence voters’ beliefs and their
decisions between exogenously-determined alternatives. Our model differs
in that the choices faced by the voters are endogenously chosen by political
parties. This approach allows us to study how the media affect parties’ policy
choices, an important issue in its own right. Equally important, it allows us
to separate the watchdog role of the media from the reporting role. Since the
parties choose different policies in different states, the policies themselves
convey information about the underlying state. For example, the public may
take a policy of deficit reduction as a sign that the current level of deficit is
unsustainable. The greater the number of feasible policies, the more voters
can potentially learn from the actual parties’ policies. To emphasize the
information role of party policies, we assume there are as many policies
as states. We show that even in this extreme case knowledge about party
policies alone is not sufficient to ensure efficient political outcomes.
Our theoretic model is related to the literature on two-sender information
transmission games (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krishna and Morgan
2001a, 2001b; Battaglini 2002). While these papers focus on the amount of
information that can be revealed when there are two senders, the main goal
of our paper is to analyze how the incentives of the two senders (the parties)
are affected by the presence of a third (the media). Schultz (1996) examines
a model similar to ours except that the state space is countable and voters
have no independent information about the state. Martinelli’s (2001) model
allows voters to have some exogenous private signals. In our paper, we
explicitly model voters’ private signals as information from possibly biased
news analysis.
Throughout, we take the policy preference of the media as given. In a
companion paper (Chan and Suen, 2008), we examine how the profit motive
affects the positions of the media. In that paper since parties are restricted
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to choose between two feasible policies, the policy response of the parties
are much more limited, and voters cannot infer the state from the parties’
policies.
2 The Model
Two political parties, referred to as parties 1 and 2, compete in a policy
space Y ≡ <. The outcome of a policy y is y− θ, where θ is a state variable
in the space Θ ≡ <.2 There is an odd number of voters. Each of them has
a utility function
U(y, θ, bv) = −(y − θ − bv)2, (1)
where bv is an individual-specific parameter that denotes the “taste” of the
voter.
The state variable θ represents contextual information that is costly for
individual voters to learn. For example, if the policy is about social expen-
ditures, then θ may include information about the marginal productivity of
social spending and the deadweight loss of taxation. Voters know their own
tastes but not the state variable θ. The parties, on the other hand, know
both θ and the preferences of the voters. We model both the policy choice
and the state variable in one-dimensional space so that the standard Down-
sian policy-convergence result can serve as a relevant benchmark. Puglisi
(2007) explores models of biased communication with multi-dimensional pol-
icy issues.
Policy preferences of the two parties are also in the form of (1). Let bi
be the taste parameter of party i. We normalize the median voter’s taste
parameter to zero and assume b1 = b > 0 and b2 = −b < 0. Thus, for any
θ, the median voter’s ideal policy is lower than that of party 1 and higher
than that of party 2. In addition, a party receives a rent r if it is in power.
Thus, the total utility of party i is
U(y, θ, bi) + Iir,
where Ii = 1 if party i is elected, and Ii = 0 otherwise.
2The unboundedness of Θ allows us to focus on perfectly separating equilibria
in which voters can infer the equilibrium state from observation of equilibrium poli-
cies. Our main argument is not affected by the assumption that the state vari-
able has unbounded support. In the supplementary Web Appendix (available at
http://www.econ.hku.hk/˜wsuen/media-webapp.pdf) we provide an example of an equi-
librium with bounded state space.
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In the beginning of the game, nature chooses θ according to some atom-
less distribution with strictly positive density everywhere. The state θ is
revealed to the parties. Each party i then independently proposes a policy.
A strategy of party i, σi, is a function that assigns a policy to each θ. Be-
cause of the richness of the strategy space, the model has many equilibria.
Instead of characterizing all of them, we focus on linear strategies of the
form
σi(θ) = θ + ki, (2)
for some constant ki. Section 3 contains further discussion on general non-
linear strategies. Since a linear strategy is characterized by a single param-
eter, linear equilibria are easy to analyze. The magnitude of the constant
gap k1 − k2 between the parties’ policies provides a convenient measure of
the efficacy of the electoral process.
We allow for multiple media outlets in Section 5. In the meantime, we
assume there is a single media outlet, which we refer to as a “newspaper.”
The utility function of the newspaper is also in the form of (1), with a taste
parameter bm. In reality, while parties and voters may know that a media
outlet tends to favor a certain type of policies, they may not know its ex-
act policy position on any particular issue. For example, they may know
that The New York Times is liberal without knowing its precise stance on
school vouchers. Hence, from the perspectives of parties and voters, the
newspaper’s taste parameter is a random variable bm, which is uniformly
distributed on [−c(1 − τ)/2, c(1 + τ)/2] with c > 0 and τ ∈ (−1, 1). (In
what follows, bm refers to the random variable and bm the realization of
that random variable.) Note that the distribution of the newspaper’s pol-
icy preference has two dimensions. If c is small, it is more likely that the
newspaper’s policy preference is close to that of the median voter.3 The
parameter τ measures the extent of the newspaper’s bias. The newspaper
tends to favor higher policies when τ > 0.
Our assumption that 0 is contained in the support of bm implies that the
newspaper may prefer a higher or lower policy than does the median voter.
In other words, though we allow the newspaper to be biased, we assume that
it is not completely one-sided. Ansolabehere et al. (2006) collect data on
newspaper endorsements in U.S. elections between 1940 and 2002 and find
substantial changes in endorsement patterns over time.4 Even for House
3All results apply to the case where the distribution of bm is not uniform. In general,
1/c corresponds to the density at bm = 0.
4The New York Times, often regarded as a bastion of the liberal press, actually en-
dorsed Republican candidates more often than Democrats in statewide and House races
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elections within the same year, 73 percent of the newspapers in their sample
endorsed candidates from both the Democratic and the Republican parties
when there were more than one race in the state, while only 27 percent of
the newspapers endorsed all candidates exclusively from one party.5
We treat the newspaper’s policy preference as exogenous. In general,
there is no reason why the policy preference of the media must coincide
with the median voter’s. Media outlets controlled by individuals or families
may have viewpoints that reflect those of their owners, while those owned
by profit-maximizing corporations may adopt the viewpoints of demographic
groups targeted by advertisers (Stromberg 2004). Baron (2006) argues that
newspaper owners may tolerate biased reporting in exchange for lower wages
paid to ideologically-driven journalists. We do not address the question of
how competition among media outlets affect their policy preferences.
The role of the newspaper is to inform voters of the parties’ policies
and the state. Throughout we assume that the newspaper must report
party policies truthfully, but it can report the state any way it wants.6.
Media reports on party policies are mostly based on statements made by
the candidates. While a media outlet may quote a candidate selectively, on
the whole it has little leeway in the reporting of this kind of information.
By contrast, the desirability of a policy often depends on multiple factors.
A media outlet can favor a policy by playing up particular news stories, and
it is difficult and costly for a reader to judge whether a newspaper covers
the “right” stories properly.
Let M denote the set of reports on θ. The newspaper chooses a report e ∈
M to maximize the probability of election of the party it prefers. Formally,
we denote the newspaper’s reporting strategy by ρ, where ρ(y, θ, bm) ∈ M
is the report of the newspaper with taste parameter bm in state θ when the
party policies are y.
The election takes place after the parties have chosen their policies and
the newspaper has sent its report. We assume that the winning party is
during the period 1940–1955. See Table 4 of Ansolabehere et al. (2006) for examples from
other newspapers.
5If we include all statewide races besides House elections, the percentage of newspapers
that endorsed candidates exclusively from one party in any given year reduces to 13
percent. These figures are based on our calculations using the Ansolabehere et al. (2006)
data for the sample of newspaper endorsements in 1986–2002.
6If news about the state can be credibly communicated to the voters, one would expect
the parties themselves would have strong incentives to do so. In that case the role of the
media would be limited to reporting passively information that the parties want to send
voters. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that there is full convergence when the parties
can reveal the state credibly.
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committed to carrying out its policy platform after winning the election.7
Voters update their beliefs about θ on the basis of party policies y and report
e. Let µ(· | y, e) denote this posterior belief, and let θi(y, σ) denote the states
where σi prescribes yi (in the case of linear strategies (2), θi(y, σ) = yi−ki).
We require that posterior belief µ be consistent with parties’ strategies σ on
the equilibrium path. When parties adopt linear strategies, since both σ1
and σ2 are one-to-one mappings, the median voter can infer θ from any y
consistent with σ.
As is common in signaling games, our model has multiple equilibria, and
the parties’ equilibrium policies depend critically on the median voter’s off-
equilibrium beliefs, some of which are unreasonable. We limit ourselves to
a particular class of off-equilibrium beliefs.
Condition 1 Given σ, for any y inconsistent with σ and for e = 1, 2,
µ(θ1(y, σ) ∪ θ2(y, σ) | y, e) = 1
whenever θ1(y, σ) ∪ θ2(y, σ) 6= ∅.
Condition 1 says that whenever possible the median voter believes that
only one party has deviated when he observes a pair of policies inconsistent
with the parties’ equilibrium policies. If the median voter believes that
each party deviates independently with a small probability, then he should
believe that it is much more likely for one party to deviate than for both
to deviate simultaneously. Formally, if the median voter believes that each
party i independently deviates from σi to some alternative mixed strategy
σ′i with a small probability ξ, then his off-equilibrium beliefs in the limit as
ξ tends to zero (holding σ′i constant) would satisfy Condition 1.
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Based on the posterior belief µ, voters cast their ballots for the party that
maximizes their expected utilities. The voting strategy of the median voter
is denoted by pi ≡ (pi1, pi2), where pi1(y, e) and pi2(y, e) are the probabilities
(summing to one) of voting for parties 1 and 2, respectively, given the party
policies and the newspaper report. Since voter preferences satisfy the single-
crossing condition in (y, bv), the party chosen by the median voter always
receives a majority of votes (Gans and Smart 1996).
The outcome of this game is fully characterized by the strategies of
the parties, the newspaper, and the median voter. We analyze the perfect
7See Alesina (1988) for an analysis of a reputation mechanism for credible commitment.
8Condition 1 is stronger than the notion of consistency in Kreps and Wilson (1982),
as the latter concept does not require the deviating strategy be held constant as the
probability of deviation goes to zero.
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Bayesian equilibria of the game, which require that (1) the voting strategy
pi maximizes the median voter’s expected utility given posterior belief µ;
(2) given pi, the newspaper’s endorsement strategy ρ maximizes the election
probability of the party it prefers; (3) party strategies σ1 and σ2 are best
responses to each other given voting strategy pi and reporting strategy ρ;
and (4) posterior belief µ is consistent with party strategy σ.
3 Uncritical Reporting
One school of thought in journalism argues that news media should simply
report the views of both sides and avoid making judgments. But while re-
porting uncritically may minimize bias, it also denies voters an independent
source of information about the soundness of a policy. In this section we
show that political outcomes cannot be fully efficient when voters learn only
the policies y from the media.
Given voters’ utility function (1), a necessary condition for efficiency is
that party policies must vary with θ. In Equilibrium 1, electoral competition
drives both parties to adopt the ex ante ideal policy (based on prior beliefs
µ0) for the median voter. The equilibrium is inefficient because it does not
make use of the parties’ information about the state.
Equilibrium 1
Party strategies: σ1 = σ2 = Eµ0 [θ] for all θ.
Median voter strategy:
pi1(y) =


0.5 if |y1 −Eµ0 [θ]| = |y2 −Eµ0 [θ]|
1 if |y1 −Eµ0 [θ]| < |y2 −Eµ0 [θ]|
0 if |y1 −Eµ0 [θ]| > |y2 −Eµ0 [θ]|
Median voter beliefs: if y1 = y2 = Eµ0 [θ], then µ(· | y) = µ0(·);
otherwise, µ(Eµ0 [θ] | y) = 1.
There exist equilibria in which parties’ policies are strictly increasing in
θ. In this case since the median voter can infer the state from the parties’
policies, he will always elect the party whose policy is closer to his ideal
point. But as the following equilibrium shows, the ability to elect the right
party on the equilibrium path does not guarantee that the parties will adopt
the median voter’s preferred policies.
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Equilibrium 2
Party strategies: σ1 = θ + b, σ2 = θ − b;
Median voter strategy: pi1(y) = 0.5 for all y ∈ Y 2;
Median voter beliefs: if y1 − y2 6= 2b, then µ(θ1(y, σ) | y) =
µ(θ2(y, σ) | y) = 0.5; otherwise, µ((y1 + y2)/2 | y) = 1.
In equilibrium 2 each party chooses its own favorite policy. The equi-
librium policy gap is 2b. When the median observes such a policy gap, he
concludes that θ = (y1 + y2)/2 and elects each party with probability 0.5.
When he observes a different, say, narrower, policy gap, he knows one party
has deviated to a more moderate policy, but he does not know which. For
example, the policy pair (0.8b,−b) is consistent with either party 1 deviating
from b to 0.8b in state θ = 0 or party 2 deviating from −1.2b to b in state
θ = −0.2. In the first event the median voter prefers party 1 while in the
second event he prefers party 2. His off-equilibrium belief is that that both
events are equally likely, and his voting strategy is again to elect each party
with probability 0.5. Since a party is always elected with probability 0.5, it
is optimal to propose its favorite policy.
Equilibria 1 and 2 illustrate a broader point: In order to achieve ef-
ficiency, the parties must make use of its information and choose policies
responsive to the state, but doing so weakens electoral competition, leading
to policy divergence. This idea is formalized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 When the newspaper reports only party policies, in any per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium where σ1 and σ2 are piece-wise continuous and µ
satisfies Condition 1, the equilibrium policies must deviate from the median
voter’s ideal policy in some states.
The proof of Proposition 1 has two steps. The first shows that under
Condition 1 full efficiency can only be achieved if both parties choose the
median voter’s ideal policy in every state; the second completes the proof
by showing that doing so is not self-enforcing. This and all other omitted
proofs are presented in the appendix.
To better understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, it is useful to
look at the case of linear symmetric equilibria. Consider a strategy profile
σ1 = θ + k and σ2 = θ − k. For σ to be part of an equilibrium, there must
exist some median voter’s voting strategy pi such that, given pi, neither party
wants to deviate from its strategy. Suppose k < b. Since parties’ strategies
are more moderate than their favorite policies, there exists some ε > 0 such
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that at every state θ each party i strictly prefers a strategy ε more partisan
than σi(θ). Specifically, in state θ party 1 strictly prefers y
′
1 = θ + k + ε to
y1 = θ + k, whereas in state θ
′ = θ + ε party 2 strictly prefers y′2 = θ− k to
y2 = θ+ε−k. Upon observing (y′1, y′2) the median voter cannot tell whether
it is party 1 deviating in state θ or party 2 deviating in state θ + ε. In order
to deter party 1 from deviating from y1 to y
′
1 in state θ, the median voter
must elect party 1 with a higher probability when he observes (y1, y
′
2) than
when he observes (y′1, y
′
2). Similarly, in order to deter party 2 from deviating
from y2 to y
′
2 in state θ
′, he must elect party 2 with a higher probability
when he observes (y′1, y2) than when he observes (y
′
1, y
′
2). Hence,
pi1(σ(θ)) = pi1(y1, y
′
2) > pi
1(y′1, y
′
2) > pi
1(y′1, y2) = pi
1(σ(θ′)).
That is, party 1’s election probability must be lower in state θ + ε than in
state θ. Moreover the difference in probability must be of the same order of
magnitude as ε since limε→0(U(σ1(θ + ε), θ, b) − U(σ1(θ), θ, b))/ε > 0. As
this argument applies to any θ and θ′ that are ε apart, we can construct a
sequence θ1, θ2, . . . such that for i ≥ 1, pi1(σ(θi+1)) − pi1(σ(θi)) is positive
and bounded away from zero, violating the restriction that pi1 be bounded
between 0 and 1. Hence, k < b cannot be an equilibrium. Using a similar
argument we can show that there is no equilibrium with k > b. Thus, in
all symmetric linear equilibria, σ1 = θ + b and σ2 = θ − b. Since under
Condition 1 all linear equilibria must be symmetric, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 When the newspaper reports only party policies, in any per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium where µ satisfies Condition 1 and σ1 and σ2 are
linear, the equilibrium policies must be σ1 = θ + b and σ2 = θ − b.
The parties’ policies do not converge because, off the equilibrium path,
the median voter could not identify which party has deviated to a more
partisan policy. Since one of the parties must be elected, at least one would
be better off deviating. Note that both this argument and Equilibrium
1 hinges on the median voter’s inability to identify the deviating party.
Whereas in Equilibrium 1 the inability means that a party deviating to the
center will not be rewarded, here it means that a party deviating away from
the center will not be punished.
In reality candidates make public statements to promote their policies.
Suppose, in addition to choosing a policy, each party chooses a statement
from a message set. Both Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold if the
media also report the parties’ statements. We only need to modify the
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above argument by making a deviating party also choose the statement it is
supposed to make in the state with which the deviating policy is associated.
The rest of the argument is the same.
The role of Condition 1 in Propositions 1 and 2 is to ensure that the
election is “close” in the sense that the median voter finds the policies of
the two parties equally appealing. To see this, suppose that party strategies
σ are strictly increasing, and that |σ1(θ)− θ| < |σ2(θ)− θ| for all θ in some
interval [θ, θ]. Condition 1 means that for small ε such that |σ1(θ) + ε− θ| <
|σ2(θ)− θ| the median voter strictly prefers σ1(θ) + ε to σ2(θ). As a result
party 1 can always gain by deviating a little bit. Proposition 1 would be
false without Condition 1. See Krishna and Morgan (2001a, 2001b) for a
counter-example.
The logic behind Proposition 2 does not depend on the linearity of the
parties’ strategies. We can show that in any equilibrium where the parties’
strategies are symmetric, strictly increasing, and differentiable, the election
probability of party 1 must be strictly decreasing in θ at a rate uniformly
bounded away from zero when
|σ1(θ)− θ| = |σ2(θ)− θ| < b.
Since election probability is non-negative, this suggests that the parties must
be adopting policies arbitrarily close to their respective ideal points in some
states.
Proposition 3 When the newspaper reports only party policies, in any per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium where µ satisfies Condition 1 and σ1 and σ2 are
strictly increasing and differentiable, for any  > 0 there exists θ ∈ Θ such
that
min {|σ1(θ)− θ|, |σ2(θ)− θ|} > b− .
The extent of policy divergence is large in both Equilibria 1 and 2. Al-
though we do not have a lower bound on the equilibrium policy gap for the
general case of non-linear strategies, Proposition 3 suggests that it is likely
to be substantial in a large class of equilibria.
4 Media Scrutiny
In this section we examine the role of media scrutiny in the political pro-
cess. The analysis is divided into three parts. Subsection 4.1 extends the
argument in the last section and derives a necessary condition for policy
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convergence. Subsection 4.2 explains how this can be achieved with the
newspaper’s report. Finally, subsection 4.3 characterizes the set of sym-
metric linear equilibria. Since the median voter is indifferent between the
symmetric policies proposed in equilibrium, the model does not pin down
the equilibrium winning probability p for party 1.9 Given any p, we deter-
mine the maximum degree of policy convergence that can be supported in
equilibrium.
4.1 Necessary Condition for Policy Convergence
Suppose there exists a symmetric linear equilibrium with policy gap 2k < 2b
and in which party 1 is elected with probability p ∈ (0, 1) in all states.
Consider any two states θ and θ′, with θ′ − θ = ε ∈ (0, b − k). In state θ
party 1’s incentive-compatibility constraint requires that it prefers choosing
y1 = θ + k to y
′
1 = θ + k + ε. That is,
p
(−(b− k)2 + r) + (1 − p) ((b + k)2) ≥
q(y′1, y2, θ)
(−(b− k − ε)2 + r) + (1− q(y′1, y2, θ)) (−(b + k)2) , (3)
where q(y′1, y2, θ) denotes the probability that party 1 wins the election in
state θ when the parties’ policies are (y ′1, y2). For ease of exposition, we
proceed by focusing on equilibria which has the property that that q(·, y2, θ)
is continuous at y′1 = y1. Subsequently, in the proof of Proposition 4, we
establish that all equilibria must indeed have this continuity property.
When ε is small, the continuity of q(·, y2, θ) implies that q(y′1, y2, θ) is
close to p. In this case, ignoring the second-order terms of ε, (3) can be
written as
2(b− k)εp ≤ (4bk + r) (p− q(y′1, y2, θ)) . (4)
Note that 2 (b− k) ε is the gain from implementing a more partisan policy
and 4bk + r is the difference between winning and losing. When party 1
deviates ε upward, it wins with a more favorable policy, but its winning
probability declines by p− q(y′1, y2, θ).
In state θ′ party 2’s incentive-compatibility constraint requires that it
prefers choosing y′2 = θ
′− k to y2 = θ′− k− ε. For small ε, this implies that
2(b− k)ε(1 − p) ≤ (4bk + r) (q(y′1, y2, θ′)− p) . (5)
9This probability can be thought of as determined by factors outside the model, such
as the degree of party loyalty or voters’ perception of the candidates’ personal appeal.
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Combining (4) and (5) and rearranging the terms, we have
(
q(y′1, y2, θ
′)− q(y′1, y2, θ)
) ≥ ε2(b− k)
4bk + r
. (6)
Note that either party 1 deviating upward by ε in state θ or party 2 deviating
downward by ε in state θ′ results in the same policy pair. Thus, a necessary
condition for partial policy convergence is that a party must be elected
with lower probability when it is the deviating party, given the same off-
equilibrium policy pair that produces a wider policy gap. Obviously, this
can only happen when voters can identify (probabilistically) the deviating
party. When the newspaper reports uncritically, q(y ′1, y2, θ) and q(y
′
1, y2, θ
′)
must be equal and, hence, (6) can never be met.
4.2 Newspaper Strategy
Since the objective of the newspaper is to maximize the election probability
of the party it prefers, in any equilibrium only reports that maximize either
party 1’s or party 2’s election probability will be chosen. We can, therefore,
model a report about the state as a binary signal. Henceforth, we assume
that ρ(y, θ, bm) ∈ {1, 2}. Since the labels of the newspaper’s reports are
arbitrary, for clarity we assume report i leads to a (weakly) higher election
probability for party i and refer to it as an endorsement of party i. Intu-
itively, a report that says θ > (y1 + y2)/2 is tantamount to endorsing the
party with the higher policy.10
If endorsing a party makes it more likely to be elected, then the news-
paper’s unique best response is to endorse the party it prefers. Call such a
strategy ρ∗:
ρ∗(y, θ, bm) = 1 if and only if |y1 − θ − bm| ≤ |y2 − θ − bm|.
Note that the party endorsed by the newspaper may not be the one better
for the median voter. In fact, when the newspaper is biased (τ 6= 0), it may
endorse the wrong party with probability greater than 0.5. Nevertheless, as
we show below, newspaper endorsement remains a useful signal.
Define βi(y, θ) as the ex ante probability that party i will be endorsed
by a newspaper using strategy ρ∗. It is straightforward to show that for
10Kahn and Kenney (2002) find that newspapers’ coverage of senatorial campaigns in
the United States is often slanted in favor of the candidates they endorse. Larcinese et
al. (2007) show that the coverage of unemployment by U.S. newspapers as a function of
the political affiliation of the incumbent president is systematically correlated with their
endorsement choices.
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y1 ≥ θ ≥ y2,
β1(y, θ) =


0 if βˆ(y, θ) < 0,
βˆ(y, θ) if βˆ(y, θ) ∈ [0, 1],
1 if βˆ(y, θ) > 1;
(7)
where
βˆ(y, θ) =
c(1 + τ) + 2θ − (y1 + y2)
2c
.
Suppose the parties adopt symmetric strategies σ1(θ) = θ+k and σ2(θ) =
θ − k in equilibrium. Upon observing policies y′ with a policy gap ε wider
than expected, the median voter cannot tell whether it is party 2 deviating
in state θ1 = (y
′
1+y
′
2+ε)/2 or party 1 deviating in state θ2 = (y
′
1+y
′
2−ε)/2.
Using (7), the difference in the probability that party 1 is endorsed under
these two possible states (when ε is small) is
β1
(
y′, θ1
)− β1 (y′, θ2) = ε/c > (<) 0 if and only if ε > (<) 0. (8)
Note that party 1 is better for the median voter when ε > 0 and party 2 is
better when ε < 0. Hence, no matter the sign of ε, a party is more likely
to be endorsed by a newspaper when it is the better party for the median
voter. It then follows from the Bayes’ rule that given any belief conditional
on an off-equilibrium policy pair y′, the median voter should assign a higher
probability that a party is the better one when it is endorsed.
4.3 Equilibrium Policy Gap
We can now see the connection between policy convergence and newspaper
endorsement. Let y′ denote the policy pair (θ + k, θ − k − ε). Let θ1 = θ
and θ2 = θ− ε. The issue for voters is to ascertain whether they are in state
θ1 or θ2. By definition, for i = 1, 2, the probability that party 1 wins the
election in state θi is
q(y′, θi) =
∑
e=1,2
βe(y′, θi)pi
i(y′, e).
We can write
q(y′, θ1)− q(y′, θ2) =
(
β1(y′, θ1)− β1(y′, θ2)
) (
pi1(y′, 1) − pi1(y′, 2)) . (9)
The influence of a newspaper can be measured by q(y′, θ1) − q(y′, θ2), the
change in winning probability for party 1 when there is an off-equilibrium
deviation of size ε. Equation (9) shows that a newspaper’s influence is
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determined by two factors: first, how likely a small deviation will cause the
newspaper to switch its endorsement (“media responsiveness”), and, second,
how likely a change in endorsement will change the vote of the median voter
(“voter responsiveness”).
From equation (8) in the previous subsection, media responsiveness is
given by β1(y, θ1)− β1(y′, θ2) = ε/c. Recall that the parameter 1/c stands
for the density of newspaper preference at the point bm = 0. A newspaper
is more likely to switch endorsement in response to a policy deviation when
c is small.
Turning to voter responsiveness, it is clear from (9) that newspaper en-
dorsement will have the greatest impact if the median voter always votes
for the party supported by the newspaper; that is, if pi1(y′, 1) = 1 and
pi1(y′, 2) = 0. However, doing so may not be incentive compatible. If an arbi-
trarily small deviation leads to a discrete change in election probability, then
the party which is more likely to win after the deviation will be better off
deviating a little bit. In an equilibrium in which party 1 wins with probabil-
ity p, incentive compatibility requires that limε→0 q(σ1(θ) + ε, σ2(θ), θ) = p.
Since for small ε the newspaper endorses party 1 with probability approxi-
mately equal to (1 + τ)/2, equilibrium requires
1 + τ
2
pi1(y′, 1) +
1− τ
2
pi1(y′, 2)
to converge to p as ε tends to zero. This condition imposes a bound on
the extent of voter responsiveness that can be supported in equilibrium. To
calculate
max pi1(y′, 1) − pi1(y′, 2), (10)
subject to this constraint, the solution involves
pi1(y′, 1) =
{ 2p
1+τ
1
and pi1(y′, 2) =
{
0
2p−1−τ
1−τ
when
1+τ
2 ≥ p;
1+τ
2 < p.
(11)
If on the equilibrium path party 1 is more likely to be endorsed than elected
(i.e., (1+τ)/2 > p), then the median voter elects party 2 when it is endorsed
and randomizes when party 1 is. On the other hand, if party 1 is less likely
to be endorsed than elected, then the median voter elects party 1 when it is
endorsed and randomizes when party 2 is. As a result, the maximum voter
responsiveness is
pi1(y′, 1)− pi1(y′, 2) = min {2p/(1 + τ), 2(1 − p)/(1 − τ)} . (12)
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Figure 1
Maximum difference between pi1(y′, 1) and pi2(y′, 2) for various values of τ
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Figure 1 illustrates the value of the maximum voter responsiveness given
various values of p. Voter responsiveness reaches a maximum of 1 when
τ = 2p − 1, and it decreases monotonically as τ deviates away from this
value in either direction. One can see that an unbiased newspaper (τ = 0)
is not always the most influential. If voters tend to vote for party 2 on the
equilibrium path (p = 0.2, say), then a newspaper is most influential when
it is biased for party 2 (τ = −0.6).
Substitute (8), (9), and (12) into the incentive compatibility constraint
(6), we obtain a necessary condition for a symmetric linear equilibrium with
policy gap 2k:
2(b− k)
4bk + r
≤ 1
c
min
{
2p
1 + τ
,
2(1 − p)
1− τ
}
. (13)
The right-hand-side of (13) represents the maximum influence of the newspa-
per. The left-hand-side, which measures the benefit-cost ratio of a marginal
deviation toward a more partisan policy, is decreasing in k, since the par-
ties have weaker incentives to deviate when their policies are closer to their
respective ideals. Condition (13) thus imposes a lower bound on k. We
characterize the set of linear symmetric equilibria for the case where the
support of the distribution of bm contains [−b/2, b/2].
Proposition 4 Suppose [−c(1 − τ)/2, c(1 + τ)/2] ⊃ [−b/2, b/2]. Let k∗ ≡
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max{0, kˆ}, where kˆ is defined by the equation
2(b− kˆ)
4bkˆ + r
=
1
c
min
{
2p
1 + τ
,
2(1 − p)
1− τ
}
. (14)
Then for any p ∈ [0, 1], the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a linear perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the parties’ strategies
are σ1 = θ + k and σ2 = θ − k and party 1 wins with constant probability p
is that k ∈ [k∗, b].
The variable k∗ denotes the minimum distance between a party’s policy
and the median voter’s ideal point. Since k∗ < b for any p ∈ (0, 1), Propo-
sition 4 implies that partial policy convergence is always feasible whenever
both parties are elected with strictly positive probability. By comparison,
k = b is the only linear equilibrium outcome when the newspaper does not
report θ. Thus, even when potentially biased, critical reporting can still
make the parties more responsive to the interest of the median voter.
Recall that party policies do not converge when the newspaper reports
uncritically because the median voter cannot distinguish which party has
deviated solely on the basis of party policies. The newspaper endorsement
helps solve this problem by allowing the median voter to identify probabilis-
tically the deviating party. At any k that satisfies the constraint (13), there
exists voting behavior pi such that it is not profitable for either party to de-
viate marginally toward a more partisan policy. The proof of Proposition 4
shows that when the support of the distribution of bm contains [−b/2, b/2],
a large deviation is never profitable as well.11 Without this condition, our
central claim—that partial convergence is possible—remains valid, but the
characterization of the equilibrium set becomes more tedious.
Since the median voter is indifferent between the equilibrium policies
of the two parties, party 1’s election probability p is not pinned down in
equilibrium. As a result, the party favored by the newspaper need not be
elected with a higher probability than the other party. Note that this result
may not hold in an equilibrium in which party policies are not fully revealing.
See the discussion in the subsection 4.4.
The effectiveness of the media in promoting policy convergence depends
on the degree of media bias. We have shown that media bias should be
measured relative to the bias of the electorate. Suppose the newspaper en-
dorses a party with a probability that is higher than the party’s equilibrium
11There does not exist a linear equilibrium in which k > b or k < 0, for in either case
the parties would gain from deviating toward the median voter’s ideal point.
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winning probability (i.e., (1 + τ)/2 > p). Then, the median voter will vote
against its endorsement some of the times. When that happens, both parties
have stronger incentives to pursue more partisan policies. Further increases
in τ leads to an increase in k∗, resulting in more polarized policies. In-
stead of helping one party at the expense of another, media bias can make
everyone—voters and both parties—worse off.
This best equilibrium for the median voter in the class of equilibria
described by Proposition 4 is obtained by setting τ = 2p − 1 in equation
(14), which yields a minimum policy gap of
k∗∗ = max
{
0,
2bc− r
4b + 2c
}
.
A greater likelihood that the newspaper shares the same preference as the
median voter (decrease in c), higher office-holding rents (increase in r), and
lower partisan interests (decrease in b) all allow greater policy convergence
(lower k∗∗) in the best equilibrium.
4.4 Robustness
It is not important for our results that the newspaper observes θ perfectly.
Adding noise to the newspaper’s observation would change the endorsement
probabilities, but the rest of the analysis would remain essentially the same.
The assumption that the two parties observe the same θ is crucial in keeping
the model tractable. If each party observes an independent noisy signal of
θ, then conditional on its own signal, each party needs to update its beliefs
on the joint distribution of the state and its opponent’s policy, and voters
need to solve a complicated signal extraction problem on the basis of party
policies and newspaper endorsement.
The assumption that the newspaper’s report on θ is pure cheap talk
means that its messages are effectively binary in equilibrium. One may
argue that news media can do more than endorsing one of the two parties.
Suppose there is some positive probability that the newspaper has the ability
to reveal credibly a noisy signal of θ. Then in the event of a deviation a
newspaper that has the ability to reveal the signal will do so if and only
if it favors the party that it prefers. Introducing this change is likely to
increase the effectiveness of the newspaper, leading to a greater extent of
policy convergence. See Dziuda (2007) for a model along these lines. Our
present results emphasize that even without any ability to reveal θ credibly
the newspaper’s report can still affect equilibrium policies.
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In reality, parties may modify their policy platforms over the course
of a campaign. One way to capture the dynamic effect in our model is
to allow parties to change their platforms after learning about the news
report. Doing so will allow the parties to learn about the preferences of the
newspaper before committing to their final policies.
The central message of this paper is that media scrutiny, even when po-
tentially biased, may help voters to identify the party that has deviated from
its equilibrium policy. The idea does not crucially rely on the linearity of
the parties’ strategies. In Web Appendix A, we present an example to show
that the news media play a similar role in an equilibrium in which party
strategies are step functions. In a step-function equilibrium, since the equi-
librium party policies are not fully revealing, newspaper endorsements affect
voting decision both on and off the equilibrium path, and the parties’ equi-
librium election probabilities are pinned down by the equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 4 emphasizes that even when a newspaper has no influence on
the equilibrium voting behavior, it may still play a useful watchdog role.
The example in Web Appendix A also shows that the assumption that
0 is in the support of bm, while crucial for the existence of a partially con-
verging linear equilibrium, is not necessary for a newspaper to be influential
in a step-function equilibrium. Intuitively, in a step-function equilibrium
voters only rely on the newspaper to deter the parties from deviating from
one step to another step. Hence, the newspaper endorsement only need to
be informative when the party policy gap is one step too wide or more.
In the construction of the linear equilibria in Proposition 4, we assume
that 0 is in the interior of the support of bm. The argument survives when
the support has 0 as its boundary point, so that the newspaper is known
to be biased to one side, but the bias can be arbitrarily small. In that
case, β1(y′, θ1) − β1(y′, θ2) (the difference in the probability that party 1
is endorsed upon a deviation of size ε) is equal to ε/2c instead of ε/c. In
Web Appendix B, we show that a linear equilibrium with partial policy
convergence can still be supported. If 0 is not the support of bm at all,
symmetric linear strategies with partial policy convergence cannot be an
equilibrium.
5 Multiple Newspapers
In this section we extend our analysis to allow for multiple newspapers.
Suppose there are n newspapers, with taste parameters bj (j = 1, . . . , n).
Let bj be uniformly distributed on [−c(1 − τj)/2, c(1 + τj)/2], with τj ∈
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(−1,+1). We assume that voters know the endorsements of all newspapers.
Let e ≡ (e1, . . . , en) ∈ {1, 2}n denote an endorsement profile, where ej is the
party endorsed by newspaper j. A voting strategy of the median voter can
be denoted by pi1(y, e). Since voters have the same information, the electoral
outcome is determined by the vote of the median voter. The probability that
party 1 is elected in state θ when the policy profile is y is
q(y, θ) =
∑
e
βe(y, θ)pi1(y, e),
where βe(y, θ) is the ex ante probability of observing endorsement profile e.
Many results developed in the previous section can be readily applied
to the current situation. Suppose in equilibrium party 1 is elected with
probability p. Then, the maximum influence of the media is given by finding
a probability pi1(y, e) for each e ∈ {1, 2}n that solves
MI ≡ max 2
∑
e
∂βe(σ(θ), θ)
∂y2
pi1(y, e)
subject to
∑
e
βe(y, θ)pi1(y, e) = p. (15)
(MI is constant for all θ.) Following the logic of Proposition 4, the minimum
equilibrium policy gap is equal to 2k∗ = max{0, 2kˆ} where kˆ is defined by
the equation
2(b− kˆ)
4bkˆ + r
= MI.
To determine k∗, we simply have to express MI as a function of the charac-
teristics of the media. A higher media influence leads to a smaller equilib-
rium policy gap. We illustrate the calculations with two examples. In the
first example, there are two newspapers with preferences that are perfectly
correlated. In the second example, there are a large number of newspapers
with preferences that are independent and identically distributed.
In the case of perfectly correlated preferences with two newspapers A and
B, there is a constant gap between the ideal policies of the two newspapers.
We can let bB = bA − c(τA − τB). Without loss of generality, assume that
τA ≥ τB . Then newspaper A endorses party 1 whenever newspaper B does.
There are only three possible endorsement profiles: (1, 1), (1, 2), and (2, 2).
The characterization of equilibria in this example is given in Web Ap-
pendix C. As in the case of a single newspaper, the influence of the media
depends on the magnitude of τA and τB relative to the equilibrium behavior
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of the median voter. Suppose the median voter elects party 1 with prob-
ability p in equilibrium. If τA ≥ τB > 2p − 1, then the probability of the
endorsement profile (1, 1) is greater than p on the equilibrium path, while the
combined probability of (1, 2) and (2, 2) is less than p. For small deviations,
to satisfy the constraint that q(y, θ) = p, the median voter treats (1, 1) as a
neutral signal (meaning that he votes for both parties with positive proba-
bility) and treats both (1, 2) and (2, 2) as signals against party 1 (meaning
that he votes for party 1 with probability zero). In other words, the median
voter chooses party 1 with positive probability if and only if newspaper B
endorses party 1. The minimum equilibrium policy gap is therefore identical
to that when there is a single newspaper with a bias equal to τB . Similar
reasoning establishes that when 2p− 1 > τA ≥ τB , the minimum policy gap
with two newspapers is the same as the minimum policy gap when there is
a single newspaper with a bias τA. In either case, when the two newspapers
are biased in the same direction relative to the median voter, it is the less
extreme newspaper that determines equilibrium policy outcomes.
In the case when the newspapers are biased in opposite directions relative
to the median voter, we have τA ≥ 2p − 1 ≥ τB . Now on the equilibrium
path the probability of (1, 1) is less than p and the probability of (2, 2) is less
than 1− p. For small deviations the median voter treats (1, 1) as a signal in
favor of party 1 (i.e., pi1(y, (1, 1)) = 1), (2, 2) as one in favor of party 2 (i.e.,
pi1(y, (2, 2)) = 0), and (1, 2) as one that is neutral. A maximum influence of
the media in this case is given by
MI = 2
(
1
2c
)(
pi1(y, (1, 1)) − pi1(y, (2, 2))) = 1
c
.
This is the same as the case of a single newspaper with a bias τ = 2p − 1.
In this case, the best equilibrium policy gap k∗∗ can be supported.
Two lessons can be drawn from this example. First, the presence of
multiple media outlets encourages political parties to adopt policies that
more closely reflect the policy preference of the median voter. Regardless of
whether the two newspapers have the same bias or opposite biases relative
to the median voter, we have
MI(τA, τB) ≥ max{MI(τA),MI(τB)}.
Second, the extent of media bias cannot be assessed by examining the bias
of each individual media outlet in isolation. The influence of one newspaper
depends on the bias of the other newspaper. It is the ecology of the media
rather than the biases of individual outlets that determines their role in
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the political process. These lessons are further illustrated by our second
example.
In our second example, the mass media are made up of n independent
newspapers with identical bias τ . As all newspapers are identical, the poste-
rior belief of the median voter depends only on the number of endorsements
each party receives. Let x be the number of newspapers that endorse party
1. In equilibrium x follows a binomial distribution,
f(n, x) ≡
(
n
x
)
τˆx(1− τˆ)n−x, (16)
where τˆ = (1 + τ)/2.
Let x∗ be the p-th quantile of x. Then x = x∗ is the neutral signal. The
median voter votes for party 1 with probability one if x ≥ x∗ + 1 and he
votes for party 1 with probability zero if x ≤ x∗ − 1. Thus, any individual
newspaper can influence the electoral outcome if and only if there are exactly
x∗ − 1 or x∗ other newspapers that endorses party 1. The influence of the
media as a group is just n times of the influence of an individual newspaper.
The influence of an individual newspaper goes to 0 at the rate 1/
√
n as
n approaches infinity. Hence, regardless of the magnitude of the bias τ ,
the influence of the media as a group grows at the rate
√
n. We have the
following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose all news media outlets are identical and indepen-
dent, and that the support of bj contains [−b, b]. Then as the number of
media outlets tends to infinity, the minimum equilibrium policy gap that is
consistent with party 1 being elected with probability p tends to zero.
6 Conclusion
We provide an analysis of the role of the media in the political process. In
an environment in which voters have little incentive to collect information
about public policies, the media offer two types of news that help inform
voters’ decisions. The first type is direct reporting of the policies proposed
by political parties. There is relatively little distortion and manipulation of
this type of hard news in modern media. The second type of news ranges
from analysis of news background to critical commentary on public policies
to endorsement of campaign candidates. This type of news is difficult to
verify and is therefore subject to manipulation when media outlets have their
own policy preferences. Paradoxically, we find that electoral competition is
ineffective when the media only provide the first type of news.
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In this context, critical news analysis provided by the media, even though
it may be unverifiable and tainted with bias, can serve a useful social func-
tion. We show that competition for positive news analysis provides an in-
centive for political parties to pursue more centrist policies. This role of the
media, however, is quite subtle and may be difficult to detect empirically,
because in the model news analysis only works by altering off-equilibrium
voting behavior. Our model only determines a set of equilibrium policy
choices, but it does not pin down the equilibrium probability of winning for
each political party. So, observing the relationship between the frequency
of media endorsement and the frequency of electoral success may not ade-
quately capture the influence of the media on the political process.
We also find that the common notion of “media bias” has to be exam-
ined carefully. Since voters interpret news rationally in our model, the party
favored by the media need not be elected with a higher probability. More-
over, the bias of the media should be measured relative to the behavior of
the median voter. When there is a single media outlet, the most effective
news outlet is one with a bias similar to that of the median voter (i.e., it
endorses a certain party with the same frequency as the median voter elects
that party), for then the median voter’s voting choice can be most respon-
sive to the news analysis offered by that news outlet. Even when media bias
is harmful, it does not bias party policies in a systematic direction. Instead,
the detrimental effect of media bias is manifested through greater policy
polarization, which hurts the interests of all voters. The notion of media
bias is even more complex when there are multiple media outlets, since it is
the ecology of the media rather than the biases of individual media outlets
that determine policy outcomes. Generally, one way to induce more centrist
policies is to ensure that the media contain multiple independent voices. As
the number of independent media outlets becomes arbitrarily large, there
exists an equilibrium with full policy convergence.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose, by way of contradiction, there exists an equilibrium σ∗ such that
(1) for all θ either σ∗1(θ) or σ
∗
2(θ) is equal to θ; and (2) there exists some
i and θ′ such that σ∗i (θ
′) 6= θ′ (with i = 2, say). Since σ∗2 is piece-wise
continuous, there exists θ′′ near θ′ and ε > 0 such that σ∗2(θ) 6= θ for all
θ ∈ (θ′′ − ε, θ′′ + ε); it follows that σ∗1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (θ′′ − ε, θ′′ + ε).
Select θ˜ ∈ (θ′′, θ′′ + ε) such that in state θ′′ party 1 strictly prefers σ∗1(θ˜) to
σ∗1(θ
′′) and the median voter strictly prefer σ∗1(θ˜) to σ
∗
2(θ
′′). By Condition
1, upon observing y ≡ (σ∗1(θ˜), σ∗2(θ′′)), the median voter must believe that
the true state is either θ′′ or θ˜. Since the median voter, by construction,
strictly prefers σ∗1(θ˜) to σ
∗
2(θ
′′) in either θ′′ or θ˜, he must elect party 1 when
he observes y. Party 1 therefore will be better off choosing σ∗1(θ˜) in state
θ′′, contradicting the supposition that σ∗ is an equilibrium. Hence, if in
equilibrium at least one party chooses θ in each θ, then it must be that both
parties choose θ in all θ. But by Proposition 2, σ1(θ) = σ2(θ) = θ cannot
be part of an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose σ1 and σ2 are strictly increasing and differentiable, and there exists
ε > 0 such that, for all θ ∈ Θ,
θ − b + ε < σ2(θ) ≤ σ1(θ) < b + θ − ε. (17)
Let
p˜i1(θ1, θ2) ≡ pi1(σ(θ1), σ(θ2))
denote party 1’s election probability under policy platforms σ1(θ1) and
σ2(θ2), and let p(θ) ≡ p˜i1(θ, θ) denote party 1’s equilibrium election proba-
bility.
For any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, incentive compatibility requires that party 1 prefers
σ1(θ) to σ1(θ
′) in θ, while party 2 prefers σ2(θ
′) to σ2(θ) in θ
′. Hence,
p(θ) (U1(σ1(θ), θ) + r) + (1− p(θ))U1(σ2(θ), θ) (18)
≥ p˜i1(θ′, θ) (U1(σ1(θ′), θ) + r) + (1− p˜i1(θ′, θ))U1(σ2(θ), θ),
and (
1− p(θ′)) (U2(σ2(θ′), θ′) + r) + p(θ′)U2(σ1(θ′), θ′) (19)
≥ (1− p˜i1(θ′, θ)) (U2(σ2(θ), θ′) + r) + p˜i1(θ′, θ)U2(σ1(θ′), θ′),
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Define, for i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i,
Di(θi, θ) ≡ Ui(σi(θi), θ)− Ui(σj(θ), θ) + r
as the difference in payoff for party i between winning with platform σi(θi)
and losing to platform σj(θ) in state θ. Since Di(θ, θ) > 0 for all θ by
supposition, equations (18) and (19) can be written as
p(θ)
D1(θ, θ)
D1(θ′, θ)
≥ p˜i1(θ′, θ) (20)
and (
1− p(θ′)) D2(θ′, θ′)
D2(θ, θ′)
≥ 1− p˜i1(θ′, θ) (21)
Combining equations (20) and (21) gives
p(θ)
D1(θ, θ)
D1(θ′, θ)
≥ 1− (1− p(θ′)) D2(θ′, θ′)
D2(θ, θ′)
.
Rearranging terms, we have
p(θ)− p(θ′) ≥ p(θ)
(
1− D1(θ, θ)
D1(θ′, θ)
)
+
(
1− p(θ′))(1− D2(θ′, θ′)
D2(θ, θ′)
)
. (22)
Since the θ and θ′ are arbitrary, we can interchange θ and θ ′ and obtain
p(θ)− p(θ′) ≤ p(θ′)
(
D1(θ
′, θ′)
D1(θ, θ′)
− 1
)
+ (1− p(θ))
(
D2(θ, θ)
D2(θ′, θ)
− 1
)
. (23)
Divide equations (22) and (23) by θ − θ ′, the terms on the right-hand side
of (22) and (23) both converge to
p(θ)
dσ1(θ)
dθ
2 (σ1(θ)− θ − b)
D1(θ, θ)
+ (1− p(θ)) dσ2(θ)
dθ
2 (θ − σ2(θ)− b)
D2(θ, θ)
as θ′ tends to θ. It follows that p is differentiable and its derivative equals
the above expression. Note that by supposition, both D1(θ, θ) and D2(θ, θ)
are positive and less than 4b2, and both (b + θ − σ1(θ)) and (b− θ + σ2(θ))
are positive and greater than ε. Hence,
dp
dθ
< − ε
2b2
(
p(θ)
dσ1(θ)
dθ
+ (1− p(θ)) dσ2(θ)
dθ
)
< 0.
Since σ1 and σ2 satisfy (17), they increase without bound. Thus, p must
become negative at some point, a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Since the parties’ election probabilities are constant, it is more convenient
to express the incentive compatibility constraints in terms of the difference
between the actual policy gap and the equilibrium policy gap. Suppose the
parties adopt equilibrium policies σ1 = θ + k and σ2 = θ − k. In any θ
the probability that the newspaper endorses party 1 when party j = 1, 2
deviates away from the median voter’s ideal policy by ε is
β1∗(ε, j) =


0 if βˆ∗(ε, j) < 0,
βˆ∗(ε, j) if βˆ∗(ε, j) ∈ [0, 1],
1 if βˆ∗(ε, j) > 1;
where
βˆ∗(ε, j) =
c(1 + τ) + (−1)jε
2c
.
For any y, define ε ≡ y1− y2− 2k. Note that y can be reached by either
party 1 deviating by ε upward in state θ2(y, σ) or by party 2 deviating by ε
downward in state θ1(y, σ). Party 1’s election probability when it is party
j which has deviated is
q∗(ε, j) =
∑
e=1,2
βe∗(ε, j)pi1∗(ε, e),
where pi1∗(ε, e) denote the probability that the median voter elects party i
when he observes y and the newspaper endorses party e. Incentive com-
patibility requires that party 1 prefers the equilibrium policy than deviating
upward by ε in θ2(y, σ):
p
(−(b− k)2 + r) + (1− p) (−(b + k)2)
≥ q∗(ε, 1) (−(b− ε− k)2 + r) + (1− q∗(ε, 1)) (−(b + k)2) . (24)
Similarly, Party 2 prefers the equilibrium policy to deviating ε downward in
θ1(y, σ):
(1− p) (−(b− k)2 + r) + p (−(b + k)2)
≥ (1− q∗(ε, 2)) (−(b− ε− k)2 + r) + q∗(ε, 2) (−(b + k)2) . (25)
For small ε ∈ (−(1− |τ |)c, (1 + |τ |)c) and β1∗(ε, j) ∈ (0, 1), the con-
straints (24) and (25) can by combined into
1−
[
1−
(
1− τ
2
− ε
2c
)
pi1∗(ε, 2) −
(
1 + τ
2
+
ε
2c
)
pi1∗(ε, 1)
]
w(k, ε)
≥ p ≥
[(
1 + τ
2
− ε
2c
)
pi1∗(ε, 1) +
(
1− τ
2
+
ε
2c
)
pi1∗(ε, 2)
]
w(k, ε), (26)
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where
w(k, ε) ≡
(
1 +
2(b− k)ε− ε2
4bk + r
)
.
Taking limits on both sides, we have
1 + τ
2
lim
ε→0
inf pi1∗(ε, 1) +
1− τ
2
lim
ε→0
inf pi1∗(ε, 2) ≥ p
≥ 1 + τ
2
lim
ε→0
suppi1∗(ε, 1) +
1− τ
2
lim
ε→0
suppi1∗(ε, 2),
which implies that
1 + τ
2
lim
ε→0
pi1∗(ε, 1) +
1− τ
2
lim
ε→0
pi1∗(ε, 2) = p. (27)
Equation (27) requires a party’s election probability be continuous in its
own policy at ε = 0.
Focus on the first and the last terms of (26). Expanding and canceling
like terms, we have
(
−1 + (1 + τ)pi
1∗(ε, 1)
2
+
(1− τ)pi1∗(ε, 2)
2
)
2(b− k)ε
4bk + r
+ ζ ≥(
(1 + τ)pi1∗(ε, 1)
2
+
(1− τ)pi1∗(ε, 2)
2
)
2(b− k)ε
4bk + r
−ε
c
(
pi1∗(ε, 1) − pi1∗(ε, 2)) ,
where ζ contains second or higher order terms of ε. Dividing both sides of
this equation by ε > 0, and then taking limits, we have
p
2(b− k)
4bk + r
+ (1− p)2(b− k)
4bk + r
≤ 1
c
lim
ε→0
(
pi1∗(ε, 1) − pi1∗(ε, 2)) . (28)
Equation (28) imposes an lower-bound on k as the left-hand-side of (28) is
decreasing in k. To minimize the lower-bound on k, we need to maximize
the right-hand side of (28) subject to the constraint of (27). Since both
the objective function and the constraint are linear, the maximum is at-
tained when either limε→0 pi
1∗(ε, 1) = 1 or limε→0 pi
1∗(ε, 2) = 0. Specifically,
limε→0
(
pi1∗(ε, 1) − pi1∗(ε, 2)) is maximized when
lim
ε→0
pi1∗(ε, 1) =
{ 2p
1+τ
1
and lim
ε→0
pi1∗(ε, 2) =
{
0
2p−1−τ
1−τ
when
τ ≥ 2p− 1,
τ < 2p− 1.
Substituting this into (28) yields (14).
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We have already shown in text that ρ∗ is a best response for the newspa-
per and that any pii∗(ε, e) ∈ [0, 1] can be rationalized. Hence, we need only
to show that for all ε there exists pii∗(ε, j) ∈ [0, 1], i, j ∈ {1, 2}, such that
(24) and (25) hold.
For all k ∈ [k∗, b], each party’s policy is more moderate than its ideal
policy. For all ε < 0, (24) and (25) are satisfied by setting pi1∗(ε, 1) =
pi1∗(ε, 2) = p. Suppose (24) and (25) are satisfied for ε = b − k by some
pi1∗(b− k, 1) and pi1∗(b− k, 2). Then for all ε > b− k, (24) and (25) will be
satisfied by setting pi1∗(ε, 1) = pi1∗(b− k, 1) and pi1∗(ε, 2) = pi1∗(b− k, 2).
To complete the proof, we still need to show that (24) and (25) can be
met by some pi1∗(ε, 1) and pi1∗(ε, 2) for ε ∈ (0, b − k]. We do this in two
parts. Note that w(ε, k) > 1 for ε ∈ (0, b − k].
Case (i): p ≤ (1+τ2 − ε2c)w(ε, k).
Set pi1∗(ε, 2) = 0 for all ε. Then (24) and (25) become
p(
1+τ
2 − ε2c
)
w(ε, k)
≥ pi1∗(ε, 1) ≥ p + w(ε, k) − 1(1+τ
2 +
ε
2c
)
w(ε, k)
. (29)
For all k ≥ k∗(p) and for all ε ∈ (0, b − k], the difference between the
left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of (29) has the same sign as
(1 + τ)ε
2
(
2p
c(1 + τ)
− 2(b− k)
4bk + r
)
+
ε
2c
(w(ε, k) − 1) + 1 + τ
2
ε2
4bk + r
,
which is positive. Thus the left-hand-side of (29) is greater than the right-
hand-side. Since by supposition p ≤ (1+τ2 − ε2c)w(ε, k), the left-hand side
of (29) is between 0 and 1. Hence, for all k ≥ k∗(p) and for all ε ∈ (0, b−k],
there exists pi1∗(ε, 1) ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies (29).
Case (ii): p >
(
1+τ
2 − ε2c
)
w(ε, k).
Set pi1∗(ε, 1) = 1 for all ε. Then (24) and (25) become
p(
1−τ
2 +
ε
2c
)
w(ε, k)
−
1+τ
2 − ε2c
1−τ
2 +
ε
2c
≥ pi1∗(ε, 2) ≥ 1− 1− p(1−τ
2 − ε2c
)
w(ε, k)
. (30)
For all k ≥ k∗(p) and for all ε ∈ (0, b − k], the difference between the
left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of (30) has the same sign as
(1− τ)ε
2
(
2(1 − p)
(1− τ)c −
2(b− k)
4bk + r
)
+
ε
2c
(w(ε, k) − 1) + 1− τ
2
ε2
4bk + r
,
which is positive. Thus the left-hand-side of (30) is greater than the right-
hand-side. The right-hand-side of (30) is less than one, and, since by sup-
position p >
(
1+τ
2 − ε2c
)
w(ε, k), the left-hand side of (30) is greater than 0.
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Hence, for all k ≥ k∗(p) and for all ε ∈ (0, b−k], there exists pi1∗(ε, 2) ∈ [0, 1]
that satisfies (30).
Proof of Proposition 5
Let x denote the number of endorsements for party 1. In equilibrium the
distribution of x is given the binomial distribution (16) with parameters n
and τˆ . We let x∗ denote the p-th quantile of this distribution.
Consider the voting strategy given by
pi1(y, e)


1 if x ≥ x∗ + 1
d if x = x∗
0 if x ≤ x∗ − 1,
(31)
where the constant d is chosen such that the equilibrium probability of
winning is equal to p.
Let βej (y, θ) be the probability that newspaper t endorses party et when
party 1 deviates to y1 = θ + k + ε in state θ. Write
βe(y, θ) = βe1(y, θ) . . . βen(y, θ).
We have
q(y, θ) =
∑
e
βe(y, θ)pi1(y, e).
Let e−j be the vector of endorsements with the element ej removed. Define
sj(i) ≡
∑
e−j
β(e−j ,i)(y, θ)pi1(y, (e−j , i)).
That is, sj(i) is the conditional probability that the median voter chooses
party 1 when newspaper j endorses party i. We can write the marginal
effect of deviation on winning probability as
2
dq(y, θ)
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
n∑
j=1
1
c
(sj(1) − sj(2)). (32)
Equation (32) expresses the marginal effect as a sum of n terms, each of
which represents the effect of an individual newspaper.
Given the voting strategy (31), the influence of a newspaper j can be
written as
sj(1) − sj(2) = f(n− 1, x∗ − 1)d + f(n− 1, x∗)(1 − d)
= (d− τˆ) f(n, x
∗)√
nτˆ(1− τˆ)
x∗ − nτˆ√
nτˆ(1− τˆ) + f(n, x
∗). (33)
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Since the distribution of the standardized binomial variable
x′ = (x′ − nτˆ)/
√
nτˆ(1− τˆ)
tends to the unit normal distribution as n tends to infinity, (x∗ − nτˆ)/√n
tends to a finite limit of Φ−1(p) as n tends to infinity (where Φ is the
standard normal distribution function). Furthermore, since f(n, x∗) tends
to 1/
√
2pinτˆ(1− τˆ), the first term of (33) approaches 0 at the rate 1/n,
whereas the second term approaches 0 at the rate 1/
√
n. Thus the expression
in (32) approaches infinity at the rate
√
n. For n large, we must have
2(b− k)
4bk + r
≤ 2 dq(y, θ)
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
.
Hence, k = 0 can be an equilibrium.
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